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 Preface 
The failure of many central banks to anticipate the 2008 global financial crisis has led to 
dramatic changes in both their policies and the tools they use, including new forms of lending, 
new regional collaborations, and experiments such as negative interest rates. It has raised a raft 
of questions about the independence of central banks and central bankers. It has also tested many 
theories previously taken for granted and requires a new multi-disciplinary approach. Cornell 
University’s Meridian 180, the Global Finance Initiative, and the Mario Einaudi for Center 
International Studies have initiated a new project to develop an innovative field of 
interdisciplinary scholarship around the politics of central banking and to bring different forms 
of expertise to the discussion of complex technical issues. 
 
With support from the Tobin Project (http://tobinproject.org/) and under the leadership of 
Professor Annelise Riles (Jack Clarke Professor of Far East Legal Studies, Cornell Law School; 
Professor, Department of Anthropology, Cornell University), the project includes a literature 
review of the state of knowledge on the politics of central banking in different social science 
disciplines. The resulting papers which focus on sociology, political science, economics, and 
law, are published as part of this International Studies Working Paper Series.  
 
Based on a nation-wide call for applicants in multiple disciplines, four graduate students - Megan 
Doherty Bea (Cornell University), Adam Hayes (University of Wisconsin), Erin Lockwood 
(Northwestern University) and Marcelo Prates (Duke University) - received one-year fellowships 
to describe the achievements and methodological advantages of their disciplines related to the 
politics of central banking, as well as to identify blind spots and limitations. In addition to 
Professor Riles, the students were mentored during the year by the following faculty:    
 
• Douglas Holmes, Professor of Anthropology, Binghamton University  
• Ravi Kanbur, T.H Lee Professor of World Affairs, International Professor of Applied 
Economics and Management; Professor of Economics, Cornell University 
• Peter Katzenstein, Walter S. Carpenter, Jr. Professor of International Studies, Department of 
Government, Cornell University 
• Jonathan Kirshner, Stephen and Barbara Friedman Professor of International Political 
Economy, Department of Government, Cornell University 
• Hirokazu Miyazaki, Director, Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies, John S. Knight 
Professor of International Studies; Professor, Department of Anthropology, Cornell 
University 
 
The four graduate students’ papers were presented and discussed during an international and 
interdisciplinary conference on Changing Politics of Central Banking 
(http://einaudi.cornell.edu). The conference, hosted at Cornell University on April 18 and 19, 
2016, brought together current and former high-ranking central bank officials from Asia, Europe, 
the United States, and New  Zealand as well as economists, political scientists, anthropologists, 
sociologists, and legal scholars It initiated a conversation between social scientists and policy-
makers about the building blocks and parameters for a new intellectual architecture for 
understanding what central banks do as an empirical matter, and what they should do as a 
normative matter.  
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I. Introduction and Overview 
In December 2007, at the first signs of trouble in the interbank lending market, the United States 
Federal Reserve announced the creation of reciprocal currency arrangements with the European 
Central Bank and Swiss National Bank (so-called “swap lines”) in order to maintain these 
foreign central banks’ capacity to provide dollar funding to financial institutions within their 
national jurisdictions (Fleming and Klagge, 2010, p. 2). Throughout 2008, swap lines were also 
extended to the central banks of England, Japan, Australia, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, 
and New Zealand, with foreign drawing on Fed swaps peaking at nearly $600 billion at the end 
of the year (Helleiner, 2014, p. 40). Although these swap lines received only limited public 
attention and were largely absent from mainstream narratives of the crisis, Eric Helleiner holds 
that they not only played an instrumental role in maintaining international liquidity and a degree 
of stability throughout the global financial crisis, but also reaffirmed American primacy in global 
financial politics (2014, pp. 38-45). Nor is the salience of central banking to the global financial 
order confined to the actions of the US Fed. The quick response of national central banks to the 
2008 financial crisis and the European Central Bank’s role as a principal protagonist (or 
antagonist) in the Greek sovereign debt crisis have recently thrown the politics of central banking  
and in particular, the global politics of central banking -- into sharp relief.  
 
The global politics of central banking has been an object of inquiry in political science since at 
least the early 1990s, when the effects of global capital mobility on national economic policy 
drew political scientists’ attention to the nexus of globalization, macroeconomic policy, and 
domestic politics. Starting from an appreciation of the Mundell-Fleming condition -- the 
simultaneous incompatibility of intervening in currency markets to maintain a stable exchange 
rate, conducting an autonomous national monetary policy, and eliminating capital controls to 
take advantage of the post-Bretton Woods power of global financial markets -- political scientists 
turned their attention to identifying the determinants of national macroeconomic policy. What 
leads states to forego exchange rate stability in favor of monetary policy autonomy or vice versa? 
What institutional arrangements ensure that governments can credibly commit to either fixed 
exchange rates or low inflation rates, given political pressures to deviate from both? Given the 
seeming costlessness of central bank independence, what accounts for the variation in levels of 
central banks’ autonomy from national policymakers? From these initial research questions, over 
the past twenty-five years, the political science research agenda surrounding central banking has 
expanded and changed, in particular with respect to its conception of politics. Once seen as a 
force antagonistic to optimal macroeconomic policy arrangements, politics is increasingly 
understood as inhering in central banks themselves, as well as the transnational social, political, 
and normative environment in which they are embedded. 
 
The overwhelming majority of the literature on central banking in political science focuses 
myopically on questions of central banks’ independence from more obviously political 
governmental institutions. The dynamics of democratic politics, in particular, are assumed to be 
antagonistic to the desideratum of macroeconomic stability. Central bank independence has 
historically been of analytical interest insofar as it is seen as a means to insulate monetary policy 
from the effects of perverse electoral incentives, sectoral pressures, and partisan politics and to 
credibly commit to anti-inflation policies or fixed exchange rate regimes. A related literature 
examines the decision to fix the exchange rate from a similar perspective. Whether implicitly or 
explicitly, and with some notable exceptions that I examine in more detail in what follows, 
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scholarship in political science has primarily located politics at the level of formal and informal 
state institutions, generally at the domestic or European Community level. Economic sectors and 
classes are portrayed as having coherent and identifiable preferences over macroeconomic policy 
outcomes, these preferences are channeled through various institutional arrangements that 
determine the extent to which policy decisions are influenced by domestic social groups, and the 
outcomes of these processes are regarded as having predictable distributional consequences that 
benefit some groups at the expense of others. This highly stylized model of monetary politics, 
however, has been rightfully criticized for inadequately capturing many of the most salient 
aspects of the global financial crisis and responses to it.  
 
In recent years, studies of central banks in political science have challenged such narrow models 
of the politics of central banking, focusing on the politics inherent in even ostensibly 
independent central banks, as well as the ideational power that underpins and promulgates 
central bank independence. Such studies attribute the dominance of independent central banks 
not to objectively and universally valid economic logic, but rather to the social power and 
legitimacy of this institutional form. Most recently, political scientists have begun to examine the 
politics of central banking in the context of financial crisis, focusing less on the question of 
independence and more on changing international monetary norms and governing ideas. While 
still in its early stages, this literature builds on critiques of rationalist theories of central banking 
by displacing the traditional view of politics and central banking as (ideally) separate forms of 
social interaction and focusing more on the transnational dynamics of power in which national 
central banks, as political actors in their own right, are embedded. 
 
Given the long-standing dominance of various theories of central bank independence in political 
science’s study of central banking, this paper begins by reviewing this literature, paying 
particular attention to the explicit or implicit conception of politics in the works reviewed. In this 
first section, I review rationalist approaches to central bank independence, considering the 
outcome of central bank independence from both the policy supply and demand sides, as well as 
reviewing a handful of more detailed single case studies. In the second section, I review the 
literature that challenges to this rationalist/institutionalist paradigm and in particular the 
assumptions and vision of politics it relies on. The third section of this paper focus on studies of 
central banking that move beyond the determinants of central bank independence or capture. In 
this section, I review studies that locate politics squarely within central banks themselves and 
consider the practices and political consequences of decision-making within central banks. This 
section incorporates the most recent ripple of political science scholarship on central banking, 
one that responds to the 2008 financial crisis and considers the role of central banking in times of 
crisis. The final section concludes by considering the future trajectory of political science 
scholarship on the global politics of central banking, paying particular attention to the post-crisis 
context. 
 
This review follows a loosely chronological trajectory, one that charts not just what Bernhard, 
Broz, and Clark (2002) term “generations” of political science scholarship (they identified two 
such generations in 2002; ideational and transnational approaches to central bank represent, in 
my analysis, subsequent generations) but also changes in global political economy, most notably 
the shift to independent central banks first in the developed, then in the developing world. All 
inquiries must start somewhere and I have chosen to begin my analysis in the 1990s, as most of 
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the current scholarship on central banking either builds on or critically responds to this wave of 
scholarship. In keeping with the conception of this paper as a disciplinary literature review, I 
have attempted to confine my analysis to articles and books published by political scientists or in 
journals of political science. However, disciplinary boundaries are, of course, porous, malleable, 
and defined differently in different national academic contexts. Omissions and questionable 
inclusions are, accordingly, ascribable to my own limited and American perspective, grounded in 
the study of international political economy. 
 
II. Central Bank Independence 
 
The Building Blocks of Rationalist Approaches: Interests, Policies, and Outcomes 
 
Jeffry Frieden’s 1991 article, “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a 
World of Global Finance” is a classic within the field of international political economy and 
illustrative of rationalist theories of institutional choice. The motivation for Frieden’s analysis 
comes from the wave of international capital mobility instigated by the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed exchange rates and capital controls in the 1970s. As formalized by 
Robert Mundell (1962) and Marcus Fleming (1962), once capital markets are opened, national 
policymakers face a trade-off between intervening in currency markets to maintain stable 
exchange rates and conducting an independent monetary policy. In fixing a state’s currency 
value, national policymakers effectively tie their national interest rate to that of the currency to 
which their own is pegged. Conversely, lowering interest rates will lead to a capital outflow, 
destabilizing the exchange rate.  
 
Frieden draws upon models from international economics to analyze how capital mobility affects 
the interests of domestic interest groups, remaking political coalitions, and ultimately influencing 
the choice made between fixed exchange rates and monetary policy autonomy. Rejecting a 
straightforward application of the factor-abundance Heckscher-Ohlin model (which holds that 
capital mobility benefits owners of capital in capital-abundant countries and hurts owners of 
capital in capital-scarce countries by pushing down interest rates to match the world level), 
Frieden instead uses a specific-factors model to evaluate sectoral, rather than factoral, 
preferences over macroeconomic policy (1991). Recognizing that political behavior is more 
often sectoral -- with producers divided in preferences according to whether they produce 
tradable or non-tradable goods and services and further divided according to whether the tradable 
goods are for a domestic or international market -- Frieden generates a theoretical set of 
expectations for various social groups’ preferences over monetary policy autonomy and 
exchange rate level. Per his analysis, monetary policy autonomy is preferred to exchange rate 
stability by both import-competing producers of tradable goods for the domestic market and 
producers of non-tradable goods and services (though the latter prefer a lower exchange rate than 
the former). Variation in the relative power of these social groups across national economies 
both accounts for variation in exchange rate regimes and, Frieden argued in 1991, presents 
obstacles to international macroeconomic coordination.  
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Rationalist Theories of Monetary Institutional Choice 
 
The puzzle of central bank independence. Notwithstanding Frieden’s pessimism, the states of the 
European Union of course ultimately decided to forego monetary policy autonomy in favor of a 
common currency -- the extreme version of exchange rate stability. Political science’s central 
banking research agenda kept pace with these changes, though often while maintaining Frieden’s 
attention to domestic actors, turning to the question of central bank independence: having 
committed to some measure of either exchange rate stability or monetary policy autonomy, how 
did states choose to organize their monetary institutions? Writing in 1991, John B. Goodman 
noted that, “Most governments have placed their central banks directly under political control; 
others have granted their central banks greater autonomy, that is, the authority to act 
independently from the instructions of the government” (p. 329). Just over a decade later, 
Kathleen McNamara observed that, “Central bank independence has achieved an almost taken 
for granted quality in contemporary political life …” (2002, p. 47). How did the institutional 
common sense shift so rapidly? Charting this real-world shift in governing macroeconomic 
ideas, the key – and indeed virtually the only – question for political science scholarship on 
central banking during the 1990s and early 2000s, concerned the extent to which central banks 
were independent from policymakers. 
 
Central bank independence is widely seen to be a solution to the inability of policymakers to 
credibly commit to an announced monetary policy. As Bernhard, Broz, and Clark observe, 
policymakers have an incentive to announce low inflation policies and then renege on those 
policies in order to achieve short-term growth and increases in employment (2002). This 
tendency is particularly acute in democracies, where electoral incentives enhance politicians’ 
preference for short-term gains over long-run costs (known as the political business cycle). As 
Schamis and Way contend with respect to exchange-rate based stabilization, if elections can be 
made to coincide with economic booms, incumbent governments may increase their likelihood 
of winning re-election and any longer term negative consequences will only be realized when 
they have been safely re-elected (2003). Such explanations are supported by an extensive and 
statistically robust literature in political science examining the economic determinants of (re-
)election. In reviewing this literature, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier conclude that, “For all 
democratic nations that have received a reasonable amount of study, plausible economic 
indicators, objective or subjective, can be shown to account for much of the variance in 
government support. In multivariate competition, controlling for other aggregate issue measures, 
the economic indicators hold their own. Indeed, the savvy modeler, given the choice of only one 
predictor, would do well to select an economic measure” (2000, pg. 210). 
 
However, according to the theory of rational expectations, private economic actors are aware of 
policymakers’ electoral incentives, and, anticipating a likely defection from low-inflation 
commitments, make their pricing and wage decisions accordingly, undermining monetary policy 
pronouncements and producing an inflationary bias. Formally granting the central bank a 
measure of decision-making autonomy from policymakers is seen as a means of insulating 
monetary policy from the incentives to inflict “inflationary surprises” on economic actors, 
thereby enhancing the credibility of low-inflation commitments. However, political scientists 
observe, this relatively straightforward justification for central bank independence is not an 
apolitical one. Although a benevolent social planner who cared about reducing inflation would 
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clearly delegate considerable authority to an autonomous central bank, states are not run by 
benevolent social planners, and in practice, policymakers care about a range of macroeconomic 
and other outcomes. As Bernhard et al. (2002) observe, central bank independence requires a 
trade-off between policy credibility and flexibility: although delegation enhances credibility and 
makes limiting inflation easier, it comes at the cost of flexibility; central bank independence may 
make stabilizing output during crises and shocks more difficult. Delegation to an independent 
central bank is therefore a political decision -- one driven not by objective logic but by the 
prioritization of some policy goals over others.  
 
The costs associated with central bank independence (as well, as we shall see, as its relatively 
different benefits to different types of regimes) suggest that the significant observed variation in 
states’ levels of central bank independence may not simply be irrational, but the result of 
identifiable political forces. Central banks vary according to procedures for appointment, term 
duration, and procedures for the dismissal of central bank directors; budgetary autonomy; 
government veto power over monetary policy; explicit policy goals; performance incentives for 
bank directors; limitations on the monetary financing of budget deficits; and control over 
monetary instruments -- indicators which are typically combined to produce an index of central 
bank independence (e.g., Cukierman, Webb, & Neyapti, 1992). Bernhard et al. (2002) find a 
fairly similar distribution of countries above and below the median level of central bank 
independence leading them -- and others -- to inquire into the political determinants of central 
bank independence. A related research agenda concerns the potential substitutability of central 
bank independence and fixed exchange rate regimes which, in the absence of capital controls and 
per the Mundell-Fleming model, allow governments to effectively import policy credibility from 
the state to which their currency is pegged. If the two policies can achieve the same effect, this 
further motivates an inquiry into the determinants of monetary institutional choice. 
 
In rationalist explanations of variation in central bank independence across national contexts, 
domestic political factors are the key independent variables, building on Frieden’s sectoral 
analysis of macroeconomic preferences, as well as on Goodman’s attention to the preferences of 
societal actors.  Per Bernhard et al.’s analysis, rationalist explanations for central bank 
independence can be divided into two groups: those that focus on the incentives of “policy 
suppliers” (politicians and political parties) and those that focus on “policy demanders” (the 
social groups that feature so strongly in Frieden’s account of macroeconomic policymaking 
under capital mobility). 
 
Policy supply-side determinants of central bank independence. Multiple policy supply-side 
variables have been identified in the political science literature as plausibly accounting for 
variation in central bank independence. For example, Susanne Lohmann finds that in political 
systems with multiple veto players, central bank independence is more likely since undoing 
institutional autonomy will be more difficult (1998). Keefer and Stasavage (2002) build on this 
finding and demonstrate that it is only in systems with multiple veto points that delegating 
authority to a central bank is likely to be an effective check on inflationary tendencies since in a 
system with one veto player, attempts to impose a lower-than-preferred level of inflation would 
be overridden. But in systems with multiple veto points, “[p]rovided that veto players do not 
share the same preferences, the central bank can now successfully implement a policy which one 
veto player would prefer to override, as long as a second veto player would refuse to override. 
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The end result is that the inflation outcome will be different from the outcome in the case where 
there has not been a prior decision to delegate and veto players must bargain over the inflation 
rate” (2002, pp. 755-756). Hallerberg (2002), too, considers the existence of veto players to be an 
important independent variable in accounting for central bank independence, distinguishing 
between partisan veto players and subnational veto players (in federal systems). He finds that 
multiparty coalition governments in unitary systems are the most likely to have independent 
central banks, since they can effectively use fiscal policy to manipulate the economy and have 
less compelling need to retain direct control over monetary policy. Hallerberg goes a step further 
in connecting central bank independence to the choice of exchange rate regime and concludes 
that in systems in which fiscal policy control is more difficult, actors will forego fixed exchange 
rates in favor of preserving monetary independence; conversely, systems in which fiscal policy 
control is preferred are more likely to peg their exchange rates.  
 
Another supply-side independent variable that affects the degree and likelihood of central bank 
independence is the electoral value of monetary policy: central bank independence is less likely 
where control of monetary policy is unlikely to influence electoral outcomes. The electoral value 
of monetary policy has been analyzed as a function of politicians’ time horizons (Goodman, 
1991), domestic political institutions (Bernhard & Leblang, 1999), and, similar to Hallerberg’s 
analysis above, the extent to which incumbents are able to use fiscal policy as a substitute for 
monetary policy to respond to electoral pressures (Clark, 2002). 
 
A third supply-side variable that has been hypothesized to affect central bank independence is 
partisanship. Political scientists start from the assumption that left parties are principally 
concerned with employment and wealth redistribution, whereas right parties are more concerned 
with controlling inflation. On the one hand, the might lead us to expect that governments 
controlled by parties on the right are more likely to favor central bank independence in order to 
effectively achieve their low inflation targets (e.g., Goodman, 1991).  On the other hand, left 
parties might actually be more likely to push for central bank independence in order to shore up 
their lack of inflation-fighting credibility by, in effect, tying their own hands (e.g., Milesi-
Ferretti, 1995). According to Bernhard et al., the empirical evidence concerning the effect of 
partisanship on central bank independence is inconclusive. 
 
Policy demand-side determinants of central bank independence. Explanations for central bank 
independence that focus on “policy demanders” look to the distributional implications of 
monetary policy, finding that anti-inflation groups (such as bond-holders, much of the financial 
sector, and publics who were affected by hyperinflation in the past) may exert a significant 
influence over the shape of monetary institutions (e.g., Posen, 1995). Broz (2002), for example, 
argues that while all societies have anti-inflation groups, there is significant cross-national 
variation in how easily societal groups can verify governmental commitments to low inflation. In 
otherwise transparent political systems (roughly, democracies), the opacity of an independent 
central bank is acceptable to domestic political actors and enhances the credibility of a low-
inflation commitment. But in credibility-seeking autocracies, governments are more likely to 
choose fixed exchange rates over independent central banks, effectively importing policy 
credibility from abroad, since it is much easier to monitor an exchange rate peg than an 
independent central bank (Broz, 2002). 
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Moderators, mediators, and the conditions under which central bank independence is effective. A 
final set of broadly rationalist analyses of central bank independence focus not on cross-national 
(or cross-temporal) variation in levels of central bank independence but rather on the 
effectiveness of central bank independence for monetary policymaking. These studies examine 
how the effectiveness of central bank independence is affected by other national economic 
institutions, most notably coordinated wage bargaining. For example, Hall and Franzese (1998) 
challenge the assumption that central bank independence will always send sufficiently credible 
signals to overcome wage contractors’ mistrust of inflationary commitments in the face of 
electoral incentives. They contend that in economies with decentralized wage bargaining, unions 
are likely to seek “inflation increments” on top of the negotiated real wage in case other unions’ 
settlements are more inflationary. Because each union (or bargaining unit) is too small to have an 
effect on the economy as a whole, in decentralized wage bargaining systems, economic actors 
tend not to be responsive to monetary authorities’ threat to respond to inflationary settlements 
with deflation. In contrast, in a coordinated wage bargaining system, where wages are 
coordinated at either the peak or sectoral level, whatever agreement the lead bargaining unit 
comes to is likely to be replicated throughout the economy, so those negotiating the settlement 
know that the central bank is likely to respond directly. Accordingly, bargainers are highly 
sensitive to signals from the central bank about likely monetary responses to wage settlements. 
Through analyzing Germany as a critical case, as well as a cross-national analysis, Hall and 
Franzese demonstrate that although central bank independence consistently lowers inflation, in 
countries without coordinated wage bargaining, it does at the expense of employment since the 
signaling mechanisms that work so well in coordinated systems are not developed enough for the 
bank to reduce inflation without implementing tight monetary policy that increases 
unemployment. 
 
Torben Iversen (1998) is similarly interested in the interaction of central banking and centralized 
wage bargaining, developing a game theoretic model in which the structure of wage bargaining 
and the type of monetary regime jointly determine the equilibrium level of unemployment. 
Drawing on time-series data for fifteen OECD countries, Iversen finds that central bank 
independence improves employment levels in countries with intermediately centralized wage 
bargaining systems and, in contrast to Hall and Franzese’s conclusion, hurts employment in 
countries with highly centralized systems. 
 
This finding, he argues, also helps account for variation in levels of central bank independence 
across national jurisdictions: monetary policy has effects on the real economy that vary 
systematically across bargaining systems (taken to be exogenous) and governments have 
different preferences over possible trade-offs between unemployment and price stability. 
 
Finally, some scholars have criticized the use of cross-national indices of central bank 
independence, observing that they are often “incomplete and noisy indicators of actual 
independence” (Eijffinger & De Haan, 1996, pp. 27-28). The use of a wide range of indicators of 
CBI in these indices often conflate so-called “target (or goal) independence” (which refers to the 
central bank’s freedom to determine monetary policy goals) and “instrument independence” 
(which refers to a central bank’s autonomy with respect to the policy tools used to achieve 
monetary policy goals set by the government).  
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Some commentators suggest these forms of central bank independence are substantially different 
in terms of their politics and their consequences for policy-making and that including measures 
of both in a commensurable index makes cross-national comparisons limited in their explanatory 
potential.   
 
Adam Posen has attempted to pin down the connection between central bank independence and 
inflation with greater specificity, finding that the costs of limiting inflation are not lower in 
countries with independent central banks and that central bank independence does not prevent 
governments from manipulating economic policy for electoral gain, leading him to conclude that 
there is not a direct link between central bank independence and low inflation credibility (1998: 
336). Instead, as Posen’s research with Kenneth Kuttner suggests, the observed reduction in 
inflation associated with central bank independence is reducible to two key aspects of central 
bank independence: 1) central banks’ legal autonomy to refuse to purchase government bonds, 
especially in the face of strong political pressure to do so, and 2) the existence of barriers to 
elected politicians firing central bank governors (Kuttner and Posen, 2001: 374; Eijffinger and 
De Haan, 1996: 31). Accordingly, while cross-national studies of central bank autonomy based 
in broad indexical measures of CBI may pick up on this correlation, they often obscure and 
misrepresent the key causal mechanism. Although the rationalist/institutionalist political science 
literature on CBI has largely neglected these empirical refinements to the relationship between 
CBI and low inflation, the concomitant lack of empirical evidence for the political business cycle 
as the key causal mechanism is at the foundation of many of the critiques of this approach 
discussed in Section III of this paper. 
 
Moving Beyond Economics vs. Politics: Country-Specific Case Studies of Central Bank 
Independence. 
 
The insights of rationalist analyses of the political determinants of central bank independence, 
while most often tested using cross-national or time-series statistical analysis as in the preceding 
examples, have also been applied to specific cases of interest, with greater attention paid to the 
plausibility of the mechanisms linking domestic – and in some cases, international – political 
interests to monetary institutional outcomes. Somewhat ironically, given their focus on single 
countries, several of these case studies are more attuned to the transnational politics of central 
bank independence than the large-n cross-national studies that locate the politics of central 
banking at the domestic level, where it is variously portrayed as an obstacle or a handmaiden to 
states realizing economic logic. Given their attentiveness to historical detail, these case studies 
offer a richer and more complex picture of the shift to central bank independence than the 
statistical and game theoretic models surveyed above.  
 
For example, Maman and Rosenhek (2007) employ historical process-tracing methods in their 
analysis of Israel’s decision to prohibit its central bank from providing loans to the government 
to finance budgetary deficits, which they contend set the country on the path to greater central 
bank independence in the years that followed. Using detailed historical data, they conclude that a 
new configuration of political interests was instrumental in the shift to Israeli central bank 
independence and that the recent memory of hyperinflation in the early 1980s provided a crucial 
window of opportunity for change. Rather than confining their analysis of politics to Israeli 
sectoral interests and economic institutions, Maman and Rosenhek place greater emphasis on 
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transnational politics and U.S. power in particular in pushing for central bank independence in 
Israel, as well as on the role of expert power, in the form of a cross-national network of 
American and Israeli economists, in providing and legitimating a solution to Israeli fears of 
hyperinflation in the 1980s. Although not a single-country case study, Ethan Kapstein’s (1992) 
explanation of convergence in capital adequacy standards among national monetary 
policymakers in the twentieth century is similarly attentive to the role of  
(Anglo-)American power and transnational epistemic communities in diffusing and actively 
pushing for international monetary policy norms. 
 
Though hewing closer to rationalist analyses of (or perhaps justifications for) independent central 
banks, Chung and Tongzun’s (2004) analysis of China’s central bank complicates the formal 
institutional indicators typically used to assess central bank independence. Although a 1995 law 
specifies that the central bank is to “independently implement monetary policy,” they note that in 
practice the bank is far from politically independent and, crucially, is not perceived as such by 
domestic economic actors (Chung & Tongzun, 2004). Without significant reforms to the 
relationship between state and party, they are skeptical that legal assurances of independence are 
likely to have any effect. By moving beyond formal institutional indicators of central bank 
autonomy and examining instead how the bank actually operates and is perceived in the context 
of Chinese party politics, Chung and Tongzun implicitly complicate analyses of central bank 
independence that reduce it to an index that can be readily compared across national contexts. 
 
III. Critiques of Rationalist/Institutionalist Approaches to Central Bank Independence 
 
While case studies of the transition to central bank independence complicate the picture of the 
politics of central bank independence, they are generally not intended as outright critiques of the 
main assumption that underlies rationalist analyses: that central bank independence bolsters the 
credibility of low-inflation commitments, given economic actors’ rational expectations of 
defection from these commitments in the face of electoral incentives. In rationalist explanations 
of the rapid spread of institutionally independent central banks, politics is of analytical interest 
insofar as it accounts for deviations from what would otherwise be (economically) rational. In 
such explanations, politics inheres in democratic governments and the incentive structures of 
both policymakers and domestic actors. But these assumptions, as well as those underlying the 
time inconsistency justification for central bank independence, have been critiqued by political 
scientists who emphasize the power dynamics that undergird the economic justification for 
central bank independence.  
 
At the root of most political science scholarship on central banks is the assumption that low 
inflation is economically and therefore normatively desirable as the primary macroeconomic 
policy goal. However, as Kirshner observes, the economic evidence that low inflation should be 
the ultimate macroeconomic goal is “modest and ambiguous” (2002, p. 7). While the evidence 
supports the conclusion that monetary expansion cannot improve growth and employment in the 
long run, it is much less clear on the question of whether inflation, in and of itself, is costly 
enough to warrant a single-minded focus on inflation targeting. While there are certainly costs 
associated with inflation, some models suggest that moderate inflation is a condition of 
possibility for maximizing growth and output, especially under the increasingly relevant 
condition of very low interest rates (Kirshner, 2002, pp. 8-9). Moreover, empirical evidence of 
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the costs associated with inflation is confined to cases of very high inflation. Reviewing the 
economic literature on the subject, Kirshner concludes that, “any real economic costs of 
inflation, especially inflation below 20 percent, and certainly below 10 percent, are almost 
impossible to find” (2002, p. 9). This ambiguity is of special importance to political scientists: 
the less central bank independence can be explained by reference to ostensibly “pure” economic 
logic, the more it (and associated macroeconomic policies) demand a political explanation. 
Moreover, the economic common sense, widely shared by central bankers in rich countries, that 
the primary macroeconomic goal is to keep inflation low itself becomes an object of inquiry. In 
the absence of compelling economic evidence that low to moderate levels of inflation are 
detrimental to growth and employment, what accounts for the power of this belief? 
 
Ilene Grabel (2000) offers one such critical analysis, situating the quest for policy credibility not 
in exogenous, apolitical economic logic, but rather within a broader neoliberal project intended 
to privilege the market over other, more democratic processes. Grabel attributes the rise of 
independent central banks in Latin America and Asia in the early 2000s to the enforcement of 
such policies by domestic and foreign capital and by the state, rather than by the “truth status” of 
policy credibility. 
  
Observing the endogenous and indeed circular nature of policy credibility (economic policies are 
effective only if they are credible to private actors but policies are credible only if they are seen 
as effective), Grabel examines the power and politics that goes into making alternatives to 
neoliberal policies – including central bank independence – un-credible, citing the withdrawal of 
loans and aid, as well as capital flight. In Grabel’s account, central bank independence is not just 
a product of political power rather than objective economic logic, but an explicitly anti-
democratic political project: Because the credibility criterion requires that actors rely on the 
same models when forming expectations, the quest for credibility devalues and suppresses 
dissent from those holding alternative political or economic values.  
 
Grabel’s interpretation of central bank independence as founded in politics, rather than 
“epistemological adequacy,” is broadly consistent with Jonathan Kirshner’s analysis of central 
bank independence as a “self-fulfilling prophecy” (2003, p. 655). States that deviate from low-
inflation targets are punished with capital flight because foreign investors believe in a single 
“correct” monetary policy, despite a paucity of empirical evidence associating very low inflation 
rates with positive real economic outcomes (Grabel, 2000; Kirshner, 2003; McNamara, 2002). 
This dynamic leads to the appearance of an objective selection mechanism at work, when in fact 
capital flows are driven by shared expectations that may well be untethered from any necessary 
relationship between monetary policy and the real outcomes economic actors anticipate. “As a 
result,” Kirshner writes, “some policies, perhaps even the best policies, may be unsustainable 
solely because people (erroneously) think they are inefficient” (Kirshner, 2003, p. 655). Where 
economic explanations fall short, Kirshner continues, political explanations must step in. In 
contrast to the explanations for central bank independence I’ve broadly termed “rationalist,” 
Kirshner does not see politics as something separable from economics, but rather as animating 
macroeconomic ideas and especially the ways in which they are enacted. In delimiting what is 
seen as feasible, economic ideas (and their entrepreneurs) have significant power in shaping 
distributional outcomes: “Self-confirming ideas about money bestow a legitimacy to some 
choices that convinces the winners they are right while muting the protests of the losers. But 
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many of these policies, justified and sustained principally upon claims of their theoretical 
soundness (and superiority to other options), are of predominantly political origin and effect” 
(Kirshner, 2003, p. 656). 
 
Like Grabel and Kirshner, Kathleen McNamara (2002) critiques the assumptions underlying 
rationalist justification for central bank independence, systematically examining the empirical 
evidence a) that democracy produces a political business cycle and partisan bias producing 
inflationary outcomes; b) that inflation is detrimental enough to present a compelling 
justification for central bank independence; and c) that independent central banks produce more 
positive economic outcomes than politically dependent or accommodating central banks. 
McNamara finds a) that while governments may try to influence election outcomes, they are 
more likely to use pork barrel fiscal policies than macroeconomic policy to achieve this end; b) 
that moderate levels of inflation are associated with only very small deadweight losses and that 
inflation needs to exceed 40% per year for it to produce low growth (Bruno & Easterly, 1996); 
and c) that the strength of the correlation between central bank independence and low-inflation 
outcomes is highly sensitive to the criteria used to measure independence, the time period, and 
the countries included in the sample. Indeed, when only developing countries are included, the 
effect disappears completely (Posen, 1993). According to McNamara, the spread of central bank 
independence is not the result of objective functional benefits, but rather because delegating 
authority to an independent central bank “has important legitimizing and symbolic properties 
which render it attractive in times of uncertainty or economic distress” (McNamara, 2002, p. 48). 
Adopting a sociological institutionalist perspective, McNamara still regards central bank 
independence as “rational,” but only within a neoliberal cultural and historical context. For 
McNamara, the politics of central bank independence are most salient in the way that 
conventional, economic justifications for independent central banks reify specific economic 
ideologies and obscure the distributional and anti-democratic consequences of monetary 
institutional choice. 
 
Critics of central bank independence in effect accuse rationalist analyses of having conflated an 
ideological justification for central bank independence with an analytical explanation. If 
democratic politics are not associated with higher levels of inflation, if inflation is not inherently 
bad, and if delegating authority to central banks does not produce lower rates of inflation, 
rationalist analyses that position political actors as antagonistic to economically sound policy 
have taken an overly narrow view of the politics of central bank independence. These critiques 
tell us that the spread of central bank independence is a product of ideas – often backed by 
powerful state and international actors (notably the U.S., the IMF, the World Bank, and 
international capital markets) – that are rooted in reflexive expectations, self-fulfilling 
prophecies, and a broader social valuation of neoliberal norms. Accordingly, the politics of 
central bank independence are considerably more complicated than parsing the constellation of 
domestic interests and institutions that make central bank independence more or less likely. 
 
This attentiveness to the politics inherent to central banking can be seen in political science 
literature that goes beyond the question of central bank independence to look at central banks, 
independent or not, as political actors in their own right and as embedded in systems of political 
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and financial power that increasingly cut across national borders. Although these studies 
represent a much smaller volume of the political science literature on central banking, they are 
worth reviewing here for their sensitivity to the complex global politics of central banking. 
 
IV. The Politics of Central Bank Practices and Decision-Making 
 
Consistent with the idea that politics inhere not just in the interactions between interest groups 
and central banks but within powerful macroeconomic ideas themselves, a small body of work in 
political science studies central banks not as influenced by and optimally isolated from outside 
political interests but as political actors in their own right. This relatively recent group of studies 
engages with a much broader range of research questions than the very narrow focus on central 
bank independence that characterized political science scholarship on central banking throughout 
the 1990s and early 2000s. As befits a greater diversity in research questions, this literature also 
makes use of a wider variety of both theoretical and methodological tools, borrowing frequently 
from sociology and drawing on both internal and published central bank documents and 
interviews with key decision-makers.  
 
For example, Stephanie Bell-Kelton (2006) examines the factors that influenced Federal Reserve 
policy during the 1990s, focusing not only on institutional reforms and changing economic 
conditions, but also on a “common intellectual framework regarding what central banks can and 
should do, as well as how best to achieve their goals” (p. 5). Bell-Kelton’s data source is 
distinctive in comparison to works focusing on the determinants and consequences of central 
bank independence: rather than identifying statistical correlations between macroeconomic 
policies and outcomes, she instead looks at published transcripts from the Federal Reserve itself. 
Bell-Kelton’s analysis reveals that the Federal Reserve sees its role as managing not only interest 
rates (via the federal funds rate) but also expectations (via public communications) (2006, p. 8).  
Her article also brings to light tensions within the U.S. central bank itself, an actor that, in 
general, is assumed to be a unitary actor with easily imputed preferences. She documents, for 
example, the conflict between the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) and the Fed staff 
over the appropriate use of the Taylor rule in setting interest rates.  
 
The 2008 global financial crisis has intensified interest in monetary policymaking and drawn 
scholarly attention to central bank activities that go beyond setting interest rates. While Bell-
Kelton’s analysis of Fed decision-making is primarily descriptive, Stephen Golub, Ayse Kaya, 
and Michael Reay (2015) similarly draw on FOMC transcripts to make the more pointed case 
that the Fed’s intellectual paradigm limited the institution’s capacity to recognize the crisis-prone 
dynamics of the U.S. economy prior to 2008. Borrowing from organizational sociology, they 
contend that despite the Fed’s unrivalled access to data, economists, and financial institutions, 
their institutional routines and primarily reactive paradigm of “post hoc interventionism” 
undermined the impact of those voices within the Fed that did interpret the housing bubble and 
mortgage securitization as potentially dangerous at a systemic level.  
 
Also motivated by the 2008 financial crisis – and speaking to the significant role of ideas in 
central bank decision-making – is Lucy Goodhart’s 2015 analysis of the impact of the post-crisis 
turn to macro-prudential policy on Federal Reserve policymaking. Drawing on interviews with 
financial regulators and relevant journalists, Goodhart considers the extent to which the Fed’s 
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new mandate to gauge systemic risk is likely to politicize the Fed’s activities and undermine its 
institutional independence. Like previous work on central bank independence, Goodhart’s 
analysis primarily examines power dynamics between market participants (who generally oppose 
the higher capital ratios macro-prudential policy calls for during times of growth), Congress, and 
the Federal Reserve. In contrast to earlier work, however, Goodhart affords a significant role for 
expertise in her analysis and is far more measured in her assumptions about actors’ interests, 
noting that, “In the absence of a fully-fleshed out causal account of risk and financial crises, 
groups or individuals may not yet be able to identify their preferences over MPP [macro-
prudential policy] quickly or easily” (2015, p. 301). Goodhart’s analysis is also significant in that 
it acknowledges the changes and complexities in central bank politics that were instigated (or 
perhaps revealed) by the financial crisis, contending that the Fed was “in a different setting 
following the crisis,” one no longer characterized by a world-view of self-correcting markets and 
one in which unpredictable populist reaction to financial scandal is likely to play an important 
role (2015, p. 301). 
 
Analyses of central bank decision-making have not been confined to the United States Federal 
Reserve. David Howarth’s (2007) article on the 2002 reform of decision-making procedures 
within the European Central Bank (ECB) is a primarily interest-based account, but it nonetheless 
goes beyond the focus on central bank independence to consider the ECB as embedded in social 
and political networks, in which questions of representativeness and legitimacy play a significant 
role. The euro zone provides an especially interesting context for examining these questions, 
given the wide range of economic situations that the ECB represents and responds to (despite its 
official requirement to target euro zone-wide inflation). In emphasizing the trade-offs between 
equality, representativeness, and decision-making efficiency and effectiveness, Howarth’s 
analysis positions central bank policymaking as inevitably political, with its legitimacy deriving 
not just from its ostensible isolation from politics, but also from the irreducibly political question 
of democratic representation in decision-making. 
 
Manuela Moschella (2015), too, focuses on non-US central bank decision-making in her analysis 
of the Swiss National Bank’s 2011 decision to intervene in foreign exchange markets and 
introduce an exchange rate floor. Like Goodhart, Moschella is interested in the post-crisis shift to 
macro-prudential policymaking, affording this ideational shift a central place in her account of 
the Swiss National Bank’s willingness to jeopardize its anti-inflationary reputation. While 
acknowledging the significance of the Swiss export sector (who supported limiting the 
appreciation of the Swiss franc), Moschella nonetheless regards domestic interests and 
institutions as inadequate causes for the shift on central bank policy. Instead, drawing on public 
pronouncements from the SNB, she makes the case that the post-crisis debate over what 
monetary policy should entail afforded the SNB space for experimentation with policy 
instruments intended to manage risks in the Swiss financial sector, rather than focusing 
myopically on price stability (Moschella, 2015, p. 136). Her account affords a significant role for 
the international central banking community and transnational ideas, positioning the Swiss 
central bank within a changing global context rather than a purely domestic one. 
 
Taken together, these analyses of central bank decision-making represent a significant and 
welcome departure from the narrow focus on central bank independence in at least three respects 
that are increasingly important in the post-crisis world of global economics: they acknowledge 
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central banks as fundamentally political actors; they emphasize the importance of governing 
ideas and paradigms in the politics of central banking; and they are attentive to the changing role 
of central banks in the global economy, especially following the financial crisis. I shall conclude 
by considering these departures in more detail. 
 
V. Conclusion – The Politics of Central Banking in a Post-Crisis World 
 
It is ironic that politics is the lacuna in most political science scholarship on central banking. The 
vast majority of political science scholarship on central banking effectively omits politics – as 
characterized by contestation over not only the means but the goals of policymaking and the 
deployment of multiple dimensions of power – from its analysis. The first generation of political 
science scholarship on central banking effectively reduced politics to a single dimension: the 
conflict between inflationary political pressures and central bankers intent on maintaining a 
credible commitment to low inflation. While there is no doubt that this conflict is central to the 
global politics of central banking, politics is about far more than the distributional consequences 
of given policies. Largely left to the side in this institutional formulation of the politics of central 
banking were the ethical dimensions of government policies affecting inflation, which is 
inherently an issue of equity insofar as it is a regressive economic phenomenon.  As the 
sociology literature on central banking shows, questions of legitimacy, which are poorly captured 
by a distributional model, are central to the global politics of central banking (Doherty Bea, 
2016). Moreover, as critiques of this large rationalist literature reveal, the economic assumptions 
about the consequences of monetary policymaking are not as unimpeachable as these analyses 
would suggest. The scholarly consequences of this narrow focus were laid bare in the 2008 
financial crisis, an event about which political s¬cience scholarship had relatively little to say 
(Helleiner & Pagliari, 2011; Katzenstein & Nelson, 2013). Having implicitly restricted its 
definition of politics to the ability of actors’ interests to be effectively channeled through 
institutions, political science was very poorly positioned to account for the uncertainty, complex 
transnational networks, and diverse forms of power in global financial politics that characterized 
the crisis and shaped the responses to it. The third generation of political science scholarship on 
central banking represents a promising, albeit very belated, corrective to this single-minded 
approach. 
 
By focusing on central banks as political actors in their own right, scholarship on central bank 
decision-making makes visible the sometimes taken-for-granted, sometimes clashing ideas that 
guide monetary policy-making. In contrast to studies that assume that, in the absence of politics, 
all central banks would follow a purely apolitical economic logic centered on credibly 
minimizing inflation, this third generation of scholarship rejects the very notion of “the absence 
of politics” as a meaningful analytical category. Instead, monetary policy-making is portrayed as 
having an irreducibly interpretive – and therefore contestable and often contested – component. 
This is especially visible in central banks’ unconventional responses to the 2008 crisis (Prates, 
2016), as well as in the post-crisis transnational shift to macro-prudential approaches to 
economic governance, in which the goal of minimizing inflation nationally coexists with the goal 
of minimizing risk in a systemic global context (Buiter, 2012).  
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While much of the political science literature takes for granted the normative value of central 
bank independence, this narrow focus is poorly suited to a post-crisis world, in which central 
banks are tasked with a much wider range of policy goals, many of which can only be pursued in 
a global context.  The literature on CBI focuses exclusively on one (relatively recent) function of 
central banking: monetary policy. But historically – and in practice today – central banks have 
played an equally prominent role in the prudential supervision of banks and financial institutions, 
currency management, payments services, financial inclusion, liquidity provision, and 
macroprudential regulation. Given the institutional distinctiveness of central banks, the decision 
to let a central bank, rather than another actor, assume any of these functions should be 
understood as a political decision and one that political science should take up.  
 
Some post-crisis scholarship has maintained this traditional focus on the relationship between 
domestic interests and monetary policy (e.g., Bodea & Hicks, 2015), but it is imperative that 
political science scholarship on central banking move beyond domestic politics accounts to 
consider the transnational vectors of power – and their non-material and ideational dimensions – 
that shape the politics of central banking. An exclusive focus on central bank independence is of 
questionable relevance to a global or comparative perspective; for many central banks, especially 
those outside of political science’s traditional focus on the developed world, reducing the politics 
of central banking to measures of political independence overlooks many of the most important 
dimensions of monetary politics, including domestic corruption, competing policy goals for 
developing economies, and international pressures from both capital markets and international 
institutions. The overwhelmingly U.S.-centric perspective of the political science literature 
similarly fails to account for important differences in the consequences and politics of economic 
phenomena like inflation and currency fluctuation for developing countries versus for rich 
industrialized states. 
 
In the post-crisis world of near-zero interest rates, central bank activities that extend well beyond 
inflation targeting, attentiveness to systemic risk, a heightened appreciation of uncertainty, and 
regulatory fragmentation despite an increased need for transnational cooperation, political 
science must broaden not only its understanding of politics and central bank policies, but also its 
understand of central banks themselves. Continuing to draw on theories and approaches from 
sociology represents one promising trajectory, given sociology’s focus on central banks as 
heterogeneous institutions rather than unified actors (Doherty Bea, 2016).  
 
Political science might also benefit from further engagement with the legal aspects of central 
bank politics, particularly in a comparative perspective. It is essential that scholars recognize that 
central banks do not exist in an apolitical vacuum but are rather enmeshed in nationally specific 
legal, social, economic, and political contests. The legal literature, taken as a whole, emphasizes 
the essentially contested nature of central banks’ mandates, especially as they concern 
unconventional policy tools (Prates, 2016). This contestability should drive political scientists to 
look beyond banks’ formal institutional position and to consider the politics of interpreting, 
justifying, and legitimating central banks’ authority under conditions of uncertainty. 
 
Political science stand to gain, finally, from a sophisticated and critical engagement with 
contemporary research in economics, including heterodox economics, rather than to continue to 
rely on economic assumptions from decades ago. However, this engagement must go beyond a 
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straightforward importation of economic theory. Political science scholarship on central banking 
in the 1990s and early 2000s was effectively colonized by an uncritical adoption of mainstream 
economic models from the 1980s and early 1990s in a manner that was ultimately costly for the 
discipline’s explanatory potential and imaginative scope in generating research questions 
(Nelson & Katzenstein, 2014). Going forward, political science must be reflexive about the 
status not only of central banks’ uncritical reliance on economic models and theories but of its 
own tendency to take these concepts for granted. Such reflexivity should not be understood as 
academic navel-gazing; rather, it is essential to the discipline’s ability to engage usefully and 
critically with the complex and changing landscape of global monetary politics. 
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